Officers’ Perceptions on Inf luence of Selected Factors on General Service Unit’s Capacity to Contain Terrorism in Kenya

Terrorist attacks have lately been on the increase with security officers being the main target. Despite the preparations that the GSU are undergoing, the intensity of terrorist attacks has continued pointing to the need to investigate the perceptions of officers regarding the various factors that influence their capacity to combat terrorism in Kenya, amid ongoing threats from groups such as Al Shabab. This study was carried out at G.S.U Training School Embakasi, Nairobi, Kenya. Utilizing theory of contingencies, despite various governmental initiatives, Kenya has faced persistent terrorist attacks, prompting a need to explore underlying issues that hinder effective counterterrorism efforts. The study specifically aimed to examine how intra and inter-institutional coordination and intelligence sharing affect the GSU’s operational readiness and response to terrorism. Employing a descriptive research design, data was gathered through questionnaires distributed to a stratified random sample of 120 GSU officers at the GSU Training School in Embakasi, Nairobi, supplemented by secondary sources. The analysis utilized both qualitative and quantitative methods, employing descriptive statistics and thematic narratives to present findings. Results revealed significant lapses in coordination and cooperation in information sharing among national security agencies, which impede the GSU’s effectiveness against terrorist threats. The study underscores the necessity for enhanced strategic intelligence and collaborative frameworks to improve counterterrorism operations in Kenya. Recommendations for developing a more robust counterterrorism strategy for the GSU are provided based on the findings.

Introduction

Terrorism, which kills an estimated 21,000 people a year, has profoundly affected world politics. Between 2010 and 2014, the number rose from 8,000 to 44,000, with terrorism accounting for 0.05% of deaths in 2017. Scholars contend that terrorism is not a recent development but rather a tool used to further political objectives by intimidating and using violence against defense less citizens (Waringa, 2021).

In the twenty-first century, law enforcement agencies must overcome obstacles in their fight against transnational terrorism, which calls for greater information gathering and integration. Law enforcement organizations are essential to the collection of intelligence that guides counterterrorism strategies. However, effective capability against terrorist attacks is hampered by long-standing structural debates and a gap in the mechanization of intelligence transfer to law enforcement organizations. Complicating matters is the lack of knowledge on the importance of intelligence services in combating terrorism (Waringa, 2021).

Karmon (2002) asserted that for law enforcement to put into practice effective defense methods against terrorist acts and lessen their tactical consequences, intelligence is essential. It entails generating knowledge that affects the knowledge and judgment of rivals. Delivering superior information over others is the basis of intelligence capacity, which is the power to impact state choices. Making decisions requires both intelligence and reasoning.

Loftier analysis is a valuable instrument for state power because it prevents rivals from receiving intelligence, which helps decision-makers make better choices. Decision-makers’ options are maximized by intelligence, which also informs security agencies about its strategic use. Planning, gathering, processing, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination are all parts of the intelligence cycle. Since analysis aids security services in applying probability statements, characterizing observables, and contextualizing events, intelligence alone is insufficient (Karmon, 2002).

Ratcliffe (2016) highlighted that the practice of applying criminal intelligence to guide law enforcement decision-making is known as intelligence-led policing, or ILP. With the use of practical tactics and a calculated, goal-oriented future strategy, it contributes to the prevention and reduction of crime. ILP assists police departments in analyzing the changing danger landscape in law management, understanding their criminal issues, and efficiently allocating resources. It also helps with planning and resource allocation to meet the demands of new threats.

In view of Somali people and the 1998 East African US Embassy bombings weak regimes like Somalia, Yemen, and Afghanistan became breeding grounds for transnational terrorism in the Horn of Africa. The border between Kenya and Somalia is becoming a significant source of unrest. The worldwide war on terror gained momentum after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 (Waringa, 2021).

Consequently, Waringa (2021) emphasized that following the 9/11 attacks, the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies faced several difficulties due to a lack of cooperation and a scarcity of available intelligence. The global war on terror, which mostly relied on military methods and techniques rather than a strategic strategy, failed to handle fresh terrorist resistance.

The September 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was created with the intention of strengthening regional, national, and global counterterrorism initiatives. Its four pillars include tackling the conditions that encourage terrorism, fighting and preventing terrorism, bolstering state capacity, and upholding human rights as the cornerstone of legitimate counterterrorism efforts (US National Commission on Terrorism, 2006).

A resolution to support African nations in their fight against terrorism and extremism was approved by the OAU in 1992. In order to consolidate information and develop counterterrorism capabilities, the African Union put a plan into action in 2002, and the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism was founded in 2004 (Waringa, 2021).

Problem Statement

On August 7, 1998, Kenya had its first significant terrorist attack, which left 213 people dead and over 4,000 wounded (Njenga & Nyamai, 2004). A thorough study into this incident revealed a crisis in the regional and international intelligence community’s and security institutions’ planning and coordination. Kenya’s connections with the West are blamed by political and security players on the domestic front resulting to frequent terrorist attacks (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2017).

As a result, Kenya has stepped up its efforts to combat terrorism by passing new laws, enforcing existing ones, increasing security, and denying the funding of terrorists. Combating violent activism and fostering regional and global collaboration are further factors. Kenya has implemented new laws and enhanced those that already existed, such as the Security Laws (Amendment) Act, the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, and the Prevention of Organized Crime Act (Waringa, 2021).

This study focuses on Al-Shabaab’s ability to carry out operations in Kenya in addition to recruiting, despite ongoing improvements in coordination, intelligence collaboration, and the GSU’s ability to prevent terror acts. Kenya has made significant investments in the battle against terrorism, yet the country has nonetheless had terrorist strikes. Maybe this shouldn’t be occurring, or at the very least, its scale ought to have decreased dramatically. It is also important to look at the possible divergence that appears to exist between the officers and the intelligence services in order to remedy the existing disconnect, since the officers actively participate in the fight against terrorist acts. As a result, it necessitates a serious discussion about the role that officers play in capacity against terrorist operations, particularly with regard to information collecting, intelligence sharing, operation planning, and the methods used to have capacity against the ongoing danger.

This study intends to enhance best practices in information sharing and coordination within and among the various security agencies in Kenya by examining why the officers seem to be caught off guard by terrorist attacks. Terrorism poses a significant threat to national security in Kenya, necessitating a robust and responsive security apparatus. The General Service Unit, a paramilitary force under the Kenya Police Service, plays a crucial role in counter-terrorism efforts. This study therefore focused on understanding officers’ perceptions can provide insights into the operational challenges and opportunities for enhancing the officer’s effectiveness, with specific reference to Gsu officers, hence the rationale for this study.

METHOD

Research Design

The study adopted a descriptive survey research design. The design was preferred because it is useful when the researcher is interested in determining what is and the current condition of affairs (Gallet al., 2007). In order to address research problems, the design employs a sample of the population without modifying any factors (Ansariet al., 2022). Because the study involves gathering data at a single point in time without modifying any factors, the design was judged suitable. The data was collected by the use of structured officer questionnaire. The questionnaire was preferred for collecting data because it has the advantage of obtaining standard responses to items in the questionnaire, making it possible to compare between sets of data. Additionally, it provides more anonymity, making it perfect for collecting information on delicate subjects (Taherdoost, 2021).

Population and Inclusion Criteria

The population of this study was drawn from officer in Gsu training school Embakasi, Nairobi County, Kenya. There were 2518 employees at the GSU training school at the time of this study. The accessible population was employees only, excluding trainees and support personnel (clerks, chefs, and messengers). 2400 trainers and officers of all ranks with specialized paramilitary training and particular talents in standby companies were among the accessible population. These officers are the target because, as trainers and members of police units that specialize in controlling terrorism, they are in a good position to provide the data needed for this study. A sample of 120 respondents were selected to participate in the study. Using the suggestion of 100 participants for a survey from Kathuri and Pals (1993), the sample size of officers included in the study was established.

Sampling Procedure

As suggested by Makwanaet al. (2023), the actual number of officers involved in the study was increased by 20 percent to account for non-responses, dropouts, and natural attrition. Using proportionate sampling techniques, the number of officers from each rank was ascertained after establishing the study sample. Simple random sample techniques were employed to choose the officers who participated in the study at the rank level.

Data Collection and Analysis

The data was collected by the use of structured officers’ questionnaire. In addition, the questionnaire is simple to use, and the data collected by it is simple to score and evaluate. There were four sections on the questionnaire: A through D. The purpose of Section A was to collect biographical information from respondents, and Section B produced data on officers’ opinions of the underlying causes of Kenya’s continued attack rate despite its numerous defenses against terrorist strikes. Data on officers’ impressions of how the crises of intelligence sharing and intra- and interinstitutional cooperation limit their ability to prevent terrorist acts in Kenya was gathered using Sections C and D and getting ready to strengthen officers’ defenses against terrorist strikes in Kenya. Both open-ended and closed-ended components were used to make the instrument. This particular construction was chosen because open-ended questions allow for the collection of extra data by posing follow-up questions, whereas closed-ended questions are simpler to code and analyze (Ramilet al., 2020).

After being verified for accuracy, the gathered data was coded and entered into a file created with the use of the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS). The information obtained from the closed-ended items was categorized by goals and condensed into percentages and frequency. The information gathered from the open-ended questions was categorized into themes relevant to the goals of the study and then condensed using percentages and frequencies.

Ethical Considerations

In philosophy, ethics is the study of what is best for the individual and society, as well as methods for establishing obligations that people have to one another and to society (Gensler, 2017). Therefore, it deals with issues of what is good or terrible, right or wrong, and how individuals ought to behave. Fairness, honesty, reliability, equity, secrecy, and respect for property rights are all required by ethics (Daka, 2020). According to Hammersley and Traianou (2012), conducting research with ethics in mind is a good idea, especially when it involves human subjects.

Throughout the study, efforts were made to follow the ethical guidelines that direct research. Every legal process that governs research in Kenya was adhered to. Prior to gathering data, a research permit was acquired from the appropriate government agencies. Informed consent was also obtained by the researcher from study participants who answered questionnaires. They were formally contacted, given an explanation of the study’s goal, and asked for their consent. Each participant received fair treatment along with respect and decency. By reporting just aggregated data and utilizing codes rather than respondent names, privacy and secrecy were guaranteed. Passwords and safes were also used to restrict access to the study data. The researcher did not misrepresent the results or change the study data to fit his opinion; instead, all the sources listed in the references were recognized.

Results and Discussion

The findings of this study are presented along three objectives: (1) Officers’ perceptions on underlying factors that lead to Kenya’s continued suffering from terrorist attacks despite various measures put in place by the government; (2) officers’ perceptions that intra and interinstitutional coordination and intelligence sharing influences their capacity against terrorist attacks in Kenya, and (3) officers’ preparedness and response to address intelligence sharing concerns on their capacity to contain terrorism.

Response Rate

During the study, a sample of 120 respondents was recruited, and information was gathered utilizing the officers’ questionnaire. As a result, 120 surveys were distributed. With every questionnaire completed and returned, the return rate was 100.0%. Low return rates, a frequent issue in research using questionnaires to gather data, were not present in this study (Mulisa, 2022). The information gathered was judged appropriate for examination.

Characteristics of the Respondents

Prior to responding to the research questions, the respondents’ attributes were examined. This was deemed essential since the analysis clarifies the context in which the data was gathered and improves comprehension of the study’s findings and outcomes (Mulisa, 2022). There was a significant correlation between the respondents’ age, gender, married status, greatest level of education, rank as an officer, and duration of service and their capacity to provide enough information on the study variables.

As seen in Table I, age was divided into four groups based on the data shown in: 18–30 years, 31–40 years, 41–50 years, and 51–60 years. According to the research, 34% of the participants in the survey were officers at the GSU training school, with the majority of them being between the ages of 18 and 30 (34.2%). 31–40 (31%) came a close second, followed by 40–50 (17%), and then there were not many officers who were 50 years of age or older. This shows that officers are receiving ongoing training at GSU Training College to give them the skills they need to carry out their jobs well.

Table I. Characteristics of the Respondents

Scale	Characteristic	Frequency	Percentage
Age	18 to 30 years	41	34.2
	31 to 40 years	37	30.8
	41 to 50 years	24	20.0
	51 to 60 years	18	15.0
Gender	Male	103	86.0
	Female	17	14.0
Marital Status	Single	56	46.7
	Married	53	44.2
	Divorced/Separated	11	9.2
Level of education	Certificate	58	48.3
	Degree	35	29.2
	Others (Specify)	8	6.7
Religion	Christian	80	66.7
	Muslim	30	25.0
	Others	10	8.3
Rank	Constable	48	40.0
	NCO	36	30.0
	Inspectorate	24	20.0
	Gazetted Officer	12	10.0
Length of service	4 Years and below	16	13.0
	5 to 9 Years	24	20.0
	10 to 14 Years	28	23.0
	15 and above Years	52	44.0

Concerning gender, the majority of respondents (86%) identified as male, and the remaining respondents (14.0%) as female. This indicates that men made up the majority of the responses, indicating that men were the source of the majority of the responses. This demonstrates that the study officers’ opinions regarding the impact of particular elements on the ability of general service units to contain terrorism in Kenya were primarily held by men. It also demonstrates that the study had a higher male participation rate. These findings indicate that there are more men than women enrolled at GSU TS.

Based on responses on their socioeconomic backgrounds, the bulk of the officers (48%) had completed their greatest degree of schooling, earning a certificate, followed by diploma holders (29%). It is also clear that officers continue their education, as evidenced by the sixteen percent of them who have earned a degree and the seven percent who have earned a master’s degree. The structural functionalist view holds that education fosters a society’s stability and functionality (Daka, 2020). It is the goal of education to modify behavior. They are able to evaluate and examine their security circumstances. This shows that the police’s professional level was sufficient to fend off a terrorist attack.

Findings on marital status showed that 56 police officers (46.7%) were single, followed by 53 married officers (44.2%) and 11 divorced or separated officers (9.2%). This illustrates the officers’ lifestyle and type of work. It is difficult to get married in operation areas since most officers live in tents and in groups. An officer’s rank is determined by the length of time they have served in the military and the professional courses they have completed. Constables, who make up 40% of the participants, are the lowest cadre and represent the entrance level of the service. NCOs, inspectorate members, and gazetted officers make up 30.0% (20.0%) and 10.0% of the participants, respectively. In order to advance from the rank of constable, an officer must serve for at least eight years. Officers are required to extend their contracts to stay for an additional eight years after being promoted up a rank. The GSU officers are most impacted if the security environment is unfavorable because they depend on this profession as their primary source of income.

According to the results on religious affiliation, 25% of the respondents identified as Muslims and 66.7% as Christians. This suggests that Christians make up the majority of officers. It’s crucial to remember that the two community-related samples advanced even though the respondents identified as Christians and were not expected to depend on religion to carry out their duties.

The majority of study participants, 52 (44%), had worked as officers for 15 years or more. This was followed by officers who had served for 10–14 years (23%) and officers who had served for 5–9 years (20%). Officers who had served for 4 years or less made up (13%) of the sample. This indicates that the study included officers with a lot of years of service, which raised the level of expertise and confidence in the answers given.

Officers’ Perceptions on Underlying Factors that Lead to Kenya’s Continued Suffering from Terrorist Attacks Despite Various Measures Put in Place by the Government

Regarding internal factors, the results presented in Table II showed that most respondents (50%) agreed, strongly agreed (33%), were undecided (4.17%), and disagreed (12.5%). This corroborated the arguments by Shaffer (2019) that the police have also been accused of disobeying National Intelligence Service intelligence reports regarding the terrorist assaults at Garissa University in Mpeketoni and Maporomoko. Also, the inability of the various police units to come to a consensus on a concerted counteroffensive strategy resulted in an uncoordinated security operation following the massacres, according to reports from the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA). In this sense, the ongoing attacks are caused by a persistent lack of cooperation.

Table II. Officers’ Perceptions on How the Following Factors Predisposed Kenyan to More Terror Attacks

Factors	Strongly agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree
Internal factors	60 (50%)	40 (33%)	5 (4.17%)	15 (12.5%)
External factors	50 (41.67%)	45 (37.5%)	13 (10.83%)	12 (10%)
Global factors	70 (58.33%)	40 (33%)	4 (3.33%)	6 (5%)

Concerning external circumstances, the majority of respondents (41.67%) strongly agreed, followed by those who agreed (37.5%), disagreed (10.83%), and were indecisive (10%). This supports the claims made by Millie and Das (2012) that security officers are responsible for protecting Kenyans against security threats that come from both the inside and the outside. The proportion of security officers to Kenyans remains low, though. The politicians in Kenya, who believe they should have access to security guards to ensure their safety, exacerbate this problem even further. As a result, a sizable number of security officers are used to protect politicians at the expense of Kenyans, leaving an even more depleted police force that is nevertheless required to guarantee the protection of common Kenyans.

Regarding the global aspects, the majority of respondents (58.33%) strongly agreed, 33% agreed (3.33%) but were undecided, and 5% disagreed. These findings contradict Privacy International’s (2017) assertion that different NGO sectors are targeted differently by counterterrorism laws. Because of the countries of origin of their employees and the settings in which they are supposed to function, many NGOs are essentially singled out.

Officers’ Perceptions that Intra and Interinstitutional Coordination and Intelligence Sharing Influences their Capacity Against Terrorist Attacks in Kenya

The results from Table III indicated that most of the respondents (60%) mentioned the politics of actionable intelligence and the constraints between the police and the NIS. This finding supports the key findings of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (2017) report, which revealed that the Westgate mall security incident exposed underlying gaps in intelligence sharing between the NIS and NPS. Furthermore, when it became apparent that the attack, which was planned by Al Shabaab, might have been prevented, chiefs of both the police and intelligence services began to place the blame on one another. In response to a question about the limitations imposed by the police on KDF-DMI counterterrorism units (26.67%) of respondents agreed with Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (2017) that turf wars between military and police tactical and strategic teams overshadowed the security operation that followed the Westgate mall attack. Furthermore, the rescue and evacuation operations were delayed for days due to inflexible command structures between the military and police units and a lack of real-time intelligence sharing. On the other hand, the attackers moved with ease through the mall in a tactically planned pattern.

Table III. Officers’ Responses on Inter-Agency Coordination and Intelligence Constrains among Security Institution in Kenya

Constrains between	Frequency	Percentage
The police and KDF-DMI counterterror units	32	26.67
The police and the NIS (and the politics of actionable intelligence	72	60
The police and foreign intelligence agencies such as the FB	16	13.33
Total	120	100

Additionally, 13.33% of respondents agreed with claims made by Jeremyet al. (2017) regarding the limitations between the police and foreign intelligence agencies like the FBI or the Mossad arguments that the attack on Westgate Mall lasted for approximately four days and calls were made for the counterterrorism agencies to request assistance from these agencies. However, the Kenyan security services were hesitant to approach any of the foreign intelligence services that may be of assistance. In order to combat the threat of terrorism, the Kenyan security services sought to demonstrate their competence. The USA launched a global counterterrorism campaign following the 9/11 attacks. In this endeavor, the United States of America aimed to assist its friends in the fight against terrorism as well as tackle the threat of terrorism within its borders. Since Kenya is a well-known ally of the United States, it has long been the target of terrorist strikes.

This result shows that, even though the national intelligence agency is only one part of a larger security cycle, its coordination and intelligence-sharing functions are crucial to maintaining a country’s security. The difficulty of utilizing intelligence to its fullest potential determines whether counterterrorism operations are successful or not.

Officers’ Preparedness and Response to Address Intelligence Sharing Concerns on their Capacity to Contain Terrorism

Based on Table IV, which shows how the officers are ready for potential terrorist attacks. Regarding the officers’ training in recognizing and differentiating acts of terrorism, the majority of respondents (50%) said that it was good or very good (12.5%), while 25% said it was poor or very poor (12.5%). The officers’ formations and unit setups that prioritize terrorist detection and prevention were mentioned by respondents. Good (16.67%), very good (48.33%), very poor (8.33%), poor (12.5%), and excellent (9.17%). Regarding the officers’ ability to identify and stop terrorism, most respondents (41.67%) said that they are well-equipped (with counterterrorism abilities and tools). Others said that they are good (21.67%), very good (41.67%), very poor (8.33%), poor (19.17%), and excellent (9.17%). The purpose of respondents’ responses regarding officers’ routine job activities is to thwart terrorism. Good (23.33%), very good (27.5%), very poor (3.33%), poor (6.67%), and excellent (23.33%) were the most common responses (39.17%).

Table IV. Officers’ Preparation to Anticipate Terrorism

Statement	5 (EX)	4 (VG)	3 (G)	2 (P)	1 (P)
Officers have been inculcated with enough training to identify and distinguish terrorism	0	15 (12.5%)	60 (50%)	30 (25%)	15 (12.5%)
Officers has formations and unit’s setup to prioritize detection and prevention of terrorism	5 (4.17%)	20 (16.67%)	58 (48.33%)	15 (12.5%)	22 (18.33%)
Officers are well equipped (with counterterrorism skills and tools) to detect and prevent terrorism	11 (9.17%)	26 (21.67%)	50 (41.67%)	23 (19.17%)	10 (8.33%)
Officers daily work activities are designed to disrupt terrorism	28 (23.33%)	33 (27.5%)	47 (39.17%)	8 (6.67%)	4 (3.33%)
Officers are backed with a legal framework that provides for detection and disruption of terrorism	0	2 (1.67%)	60 (50%)	30 (25%)	28 (23.33%)

Last but not least, a legislative framework that supports the identification and disruption of terrorism supports responders’ officers. Most respondents (50%) said that the situation was good or very good (1.67%), poor (25%), or very poor (2.33%).

Conclusion

The study concludes that the officers’ perceptions revealed a complex interplay of factors affecting their capacity to contain terrorism. Training and resource allocation emerged as primary concerns, with direct implications for operational effectiveness. Community engagement and inter-agency cooperation are also critical, suggesting that a holistic approach is necessary for addressing the multifaceted nature of terrorism.

Additionally, training, resources, reorganization, redeployment, and departmental collaboration are the dimensions that this reaction illustrates. Because it lacks the necessary resources, the officers have long been unable to effectively combat the threat of terrorism. Insufficient funding, expertise, and equipment are the main causes of this deficiency. To keep up with the latest terrorist trends, Kenyan police officers must receive extensive training. That being said, the majority of the training that law enforcement officers receive today is carried over from their previous training. The Kenya Police lacks sufficient funding to upgrade training facilities and buy state-of-the-art equipment to give law enforcement officials the newest capabilities.

The study also concluded by pinpointing the elements that, in spite of the government’s ability to counterterrorism measures, contribute to the ongoing terror attacks in Kenya. In particular, the variables that limit the police service’s ability to conduct counterterrorism operations in the nation were recognized. There are three main variables that stand out: global issues, forces outside the police service, and internal considerations. The study examined a number of issues, such as insufficient budget, political meddling, conventional police practices that involve arbitrary arrests with little leeway for the prosecution, and a lack of coordination between the local communities and the security forces.

This study also concluded that the continuity of terror attacks is a function of Al-Shabaab’s ability to protect their operational intelligence by denying security agents access to that intelligence. Furthermore, there is a lack of improved intra- and interinstitutional coordination and collaboration in intelligence sharing, which contributes to the police’s incapacity to stop terror acts. The first section looks at aspects that are specific to the police force, such as insufficient manpower and material resources, problems with command and control, and the economics of recruiting and deployment.

The study also concluded that aforementioned issues have had a negative impact on the nation’s law enforcement and other counterterrorism authorities’ capacity to effectively combat terrorism. Consequently, this illustrates how an officer’s awareness of the characteristics that predispose Kenyans to greater terror acts plays a crucial role in the war against terror. Additionally, it has aided in the intellectual gathering that has prevented planned terrorist strikes against Kenya and diverted terrorist networks within the nation. Furthermore, knowing what made Kenyans more vulnerable to terror attacks helps with attack preparation and countermeasures. The general conclusion is that much remains to be done to stop the threat, even with the government and other agencies’ best efforts. The study also concerned that Kenyans’ ability to effectively fight terrorism and counter the challenges it poses is still lacking.

Finally, the study concluded that the perceptions of officers within the General Service Unit provide valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities faced in counter-terrorism efforts in Kenya. Addressing the identified gaps in training, resources, collaboration and can significantly enhance the GSU’s capacity to respond to terrorist threats and ensure national security. However, Kenya has is yet to effectively combated terrorism through the establishment of the GSU training school and the inclusion of counterterrorism capabilities in its curriculum. It also addresses issues like lack of a unitary chain of command, mistrust, and lack of strategic intelligence framework.

Recommendations

This study recommends that in order to confront the growing threat of terrorism to the country’s internal security, the General Service Unit (GSU) should Invest in Comprehensive Training: Develop and implement specialized training programs that address current and emerging threats. Enhance Resource Allocation: Advocate for increased funding and resources to equip officers with modern tools and technology. One factor that limits GSU officers’ ability to combat terrorism is insufficient finance. The GSU will be able to effectively train staff, buy essential equipment, and build up technical infrastructure for operation with adequate money. Additionally, this will allow the GSU to confirm foreign intelligence regarding terrorist threats and take appropriate action.

1. Strengthen Community Relations: Implement community engagement initiatives to build trust and improve intelligence gathering. Including all relevant parties in the process of creating a counterterrorism strategy will guarantee that advancements are in line with those of other counterterrorism actors. This will lessen the difficulties brought on by fragmented methods by enhancing coordination and collaboration efforts among diverse divisions.
2. Foster Inter-agency Synergy: Establish frameworks for regular communication and joint operations among security agencies.